Central to discussion of supervaluationist accounts of vagueness is the extent to which they require revisions of classical logic and if so, whether those revisions are objectionable. In an important recent Journal of Philosophy article, J.R.G. Williams presents a powerful challenge to the orthodox view that supervaluationism is objectionably revisionary.
Given the identification of truth with supertruth, there are well-known reasons to identify consequence proper with global consequence, rather than its local counterpart (see, for example Williamson, 1994, p.148) . To these, Williams adds a compelling new argument ( §3).
So let us set aside local consequence: so far as supervaluationism is concerned, global consequence is consequence.
The purported counterexamples to classical logic arise with the introduction of a 'Definitely' operator D, akin to a necessity operator in possible-worlds semantics:
The following results all hold, providing apparent counterexamples to the respective classical rules of proof:
Contraposition:
• p ⊨ global Dp
• ¬Dp ⊭ global ¬p
Conditional proof:
Argument by cases:
Reductio:
None of these results holds for local consequence. So logical revisionism could be avoided by identifying that with consequence proper. But this is not Williams's approach. His strategy is to argue that the present supervaluationist framework is inadequate; the results all fail in a more satisfactory setting.
Williams's case against revisionism
Williams begins by observing that plausible semantic analyses of linguistic phenomena other than vagueness, specifically comparatives, have been proposed that require delineations other than those relevant to the determination of (super)truth-value ( §2). A fully general semantic theory for a vague language may well have to incorporate such delineations. To accommodate this, let an extended model M be just like a supervaluationist model, but with a fifth element: Williams pre-empts this strategy. Against the first step, he constructs a toy non-RAmodel which, he claims, does respect the intended sense of D ( §5). He continues:
"Perhaps some inventive defender of the orthodox position could make a case that the toy model constructed above, and all others like it, are unfaithful to the intended sense of 'Definitely' (I have no idea what such a case would look like, but cannot rule it out)." (Williams, 2008, p.205) Section 3 provides just such a case. Against the second step, he argues that restricting the admissible models to RA-models involves treating D as a logical constant. Since the proper characterisation of the logical constants is highly contentious, Williams concludes that the case for logical revisionism is weak at best ( §6). Section 4 argues that the case for logical revisionism can sidestep this issue: the proper characterisation of the logical constants is irrelevant. Section 5 closes by showing that even if Williams is right on both counts, a slightly different argument for logical revisionism is available that avoids his complaints.
Furthermore, this last argument undermines Williams's case for regarding the purported revisions as unobjectionable.
Reinstating revisionism: first step
This section argues that supervaluationists should regard only RA-models as faithful to the intended sense of D. The argument rests on two explanatory demands on a satisfactory account of vagueness. The first is an account of borderline status and definiteness: what is it for a sentence to be definitely true, or an object to be definitely F? 1 The second is an account of borderline ignorance: if it is borderline whether p, then it seems somehow misguided to try and discover whether p. Why does borderline status interact with knowledge in this way? And if it does not, why does it appear to?
Supervaluationism offers an account of borderline status, and hence definiteness, in terms of truth-value gaps: it is borderline whether p iff p is neither true nor false (in virtue of being true at some but not all sharpenings). Thus definiteness is analysed in terms of more familiar semantic concepts. Note also that without the analysis of borderline cases in terms of truth-value gaps, the identification of truth with super-truth looks ill-motivated.
For that identification is motivated by the desire to avoid bivalence; unless borderline cases fall down a truth-value gap, it is entirely mysterious why a non-bivalent semantics would be desirable. This analysis of borderline status naturally extends to an explanation of borderline ignorance: since knowledge implies truth, if p is borderline (neither true nor false), it cannot be known whether p. 2 Thus the importance that D provide "an object-language reflection 1 Some deny that any analysis of borderline status is possible (Barnett, 2009 ). I take it that the lack of explanatory work for the concepts of definiteness and of borderline status outside of vagueness counts strongly against these views.
2 Field (2008, pp.154-5) criticises this account of borderline ignorance. But without an alternative, the supervaluationist should endorse it. I see only one alternative explanation for the appearance of borderline ignorance: although borderline status does not prevent knowledge, it does prevent clear knowledge; and one seems ignorant when one does not clearly know. This fits Williams's extended semantics that permits true borderline statements. But this just strengthens the demand for an explanation of definiteness. Supposing I know that p, why does it matter whether I also definitely know that p? Why should an inability to definitely know make it (or make it appear) futile to try and discover whether p? Some account is surely owed, and it is hard to see where it might come from, if not from the analysis of definiteness. I see two options: (1) It is just a primitive fact about vagueness that borderline status makes it appear futile to try to know. (2) Definite knowledge is the goal of assertion, and borderline status creates the appearance of ignorance by making it in principle illegitimate to assert that p when p is borderline. Neither approach is satisfactory without an account of definiteness. Why is definite knowledge, rather than mere knowledge, the goal of assertion? Simply postulating primitive and inexplicable relationships between definiteness and other concepts is an unsatisfying approach to of the supervaluationist's notion of truth-"supertruth" " (Williams, 2008, p.192 I conclude that the supervaluationist should regard only RA-models as faithful to the intended sense of D if they are to offer their customary semantic analysis of definiteness and explanation of borderline ignorance, as well as the point of identifying truth with supertruth.
Since no alternative explanation is forthcoming, the supervaluationist should regard only RA-models as faithful to the intended sense of D.
Reinstating revisionism: second step
Should the admissible models be restricted to those faithful to the intended sense of D?
Expressions whose interpretation is held constant across admissible models when charac- & McLaughlin, 1998 & McLaughlin, , 2004 Williamson, 2004) . 4 One might object that Liar-like paradoxes provide independent reason to doubt that the classical rules hold in full generality anyway, for languages that contain their own truthpredicate. But since T is not a predicate, but a sentential operator, we cannot use it to construct a "Liar sentence" or similar. The objection therefore fails.
I close by noting that T undermines Williams's case against regarding deviations from the classical rules as revisionary to classical inferential practice, as opposed to classical logical theory. Let ⊨ global be the global consequence relation obtained by allowing admissible non-RA-models; let ⊨ + global be the global consequence relation obtained by restricting admissible models to RA-models. Williams argues that ⊨ + global does not involve deviation from classical inferential practice by appeal to:
His idea is that, in order to show that supervaluationism mandates revisions to inferential practice, "we would have to show that inferential practice mandates moving from ⊨ + globalvalid but ⊨ global -invalid arguments to conditional conclusions. No such case has been made." (Williams, 2008, p.210) But in a language containing T, even CP* fails:
Even if inferential practice involves no more than drawing conditional conclusions from 
